Skip to Content
From Monday 12 September 2020, OVIC's website will no longer be supported in Internet Explorer (IE).
We recommend installing Microsoft Edge, Google Chrome, Safari, Firefox, or Opera to visit the site.

Section 33 - Document affecting personal privacy

Guidelines

The exemption

1.1

A document or information is exempt under section 33(1) if two conditions are satisfied:

  • the document or information relates to the ‘personal affairs’ of a natural person (living or deceased); and
  • disclosure of that personal affairs information is unreasonable in all the circumstances.

Purpose and scope of the exemption

1.2

Section 33(1) protects an individual’s privacy where their right to privacy outweighs the public interest in disclosing their information.4 This will only occur when disclosing the individual’s personal affairs information is unreasonable.

1.3

Section 33(1) must be read consistently with the object of the Act in section 3, which is to extend as far as possible the right of the community to access government held information. This right is only limited by exemptions necessary for the protection of essential public interests and private and business affairs.5

1.4

If it is unclear whether section 33(1) applies to a document, the exemption should be interpreted narrowly, in a way that favours access to information.6

Natural persons

1.5

Section 33(1) is only concerned with the personal affairs information of natural persons. The exemption cannot be applied to corporations or other legal entities.8

Deceased persons

1.6

Section 33(1) applies to the personal affairs information of both living and deceased persons.10

Applicant’s own personal affairs information

1.7

Generally, an applicant’s own personal affairs information cannot be exempt under section 33(1), unless the circumstances in sections 33(2AB), (2AC) or (4) apply.12 See ‘Handling requests for an applicant’s own personal affairs information’ below for more information.

Discretion to disclose exempt documents

1.8

The decision to exempt a document under section 33(1) is a discretionary power.14 This means an agency or Minister can choose to provide access to information that would otherwise be exempt under section 33, where it is proper to do so and where the agency or Minister is not legally prevented from providing access.

For more information, see section 16 – Access to documents apart from Act.

1.9

When considering the release of personal affairs information outside the Act, an agency must consider its obligations under the Information Privacy Principles (IPPs) in the Privacy and Data Protection Act 2014 (Vic) (PDP Act).

More information

For more information about the IPPs, see OVIC’s IPP Guidelines and other privacy resources.

Steps to applying the exemption

1.10

An agency or Minister seeking to apply the section 33(1) exemption should:

  1. Identify the personal affairs information contained in the document, or the personal affairs information that would be revealed if the document was disclosed.
  2. Consult with the applicant to see if they would like access to other individuals’ personal affairs information and explain the scope of the personal affairs information (for example, names and phone numbers). Ask the applicant whether they agree to narrow the scope of the request to remove all or some personal affairs information.
  3. Identify and isolate the applicant’s own personal affairs information. This is not exempt unless:
    1. the request is made to an information sharing entity or authorised Hub entity,20 which considers that the release of the applicant’s own information to the applicant would increase the risk to:
      1. a primary person’s21 safety from family violence;22 or
      2. a child or group of children’s safety;23 or
    2. the request is for the applicant’s own health information, where the principal officer (or a health practitioner appointed by the agency) reasonably believes providing the applicant with the information would pose a serious threat to the life or health of the applicant;24 or
    3. the applicant’s own personal affairs information is intertwined with personal affairs information of third parties and is unable to be effectively isolated.
  4. Unless one of the exceptions in section 33(2C) applies, consult with the individuals whose personal affairs information appears in the document, to seek their views on whether it should be released.
    1. Consider whether an extension of time under section 21(2)(a) is permitted due to the need for consultation under section 33(2B).
  5. Determine whether release of a third party’s personal affairs information is unreasonable in all the circumstances having regard to the considerations in these Guidelines, such as:
    1. The nature of the information in the document and the circumstances in which it was obtained.
    2. The applicant’s reasons for seeking access and the likelihood of further disclosure.
    3. The wishes or interests of the subject of the information.
    4. Public interest factors for or against disclosure.
    5. Life and physical safety.
  6. If a decision is made to release personal affairs information, notify any affected third party who did not consent to the disclosure of their personal affairs information, or did not reply. Inform them of the decision, their right to appeal to the Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal (VCAT) and how long they have to apply to VCAT (60-days).
  7. Wait until the conclusion of any appeal period or VCAT proceedings before providing the documents to the applicant. If there are other documents falling within the request that do not contain the third party’s personal affairs information, these can be released to the applicant at the same time as the decision, without needing to wait for the appeal period to end.

Does the document contain or reveal personal affairs information?

1.11

The first element of the exemption requires the document to contain or reveal ‘information relating to the personal affairs of any person’ (personal affairs information).

1.12

The concept of personal affairs information is broad. Information will relate to the personal affairs of a person if it ‘concerns or affects that person as an individual’.28 This includes information relating to health, private behaviour, home life, or personal or family relationships of individuals.29

1.13

Section 33(9) defines personal affairs information to include:

  • information that identifies any person;
  • information that discloses a person’s address or location; or
  • any information from which a person’s identity, address or location can reasonably be determined.
1.14

The concept of ‘personal affairs information’ is not the same as ‘confidential information’. The mere fact that information was obtained in confidence from a person does not make it information about the personal affairs of that person.30

Disclosing or revealing personal affairs information

1.15

Section 33(1) exempts a document if its ‘disclosure under this Act would involve the unreasonable disclosure of information relating to the personal affairs of any person’.

1.16

A document will involve the disclosure of personal affairs information if the applicant or any member of the public could directly or indirectly identify an individual or their address or location from the information.49

1.17

A document will indirectly disclose personal affairs information if it contains information from which any person’s identity, address or location can reasonably be determined. This means that a document can be exempt under section 33(1) where the document itself does not contain personal affairs information, but its disclosure would reveal personal affairs information.

1.18

Personal affairs information can be revealed or indirectly disclosed by connecting or linking the information in the disclosed document with other information available to the applicant.50

For more information about connecting or linking information from different sources to identify a person, see OVIC’s resources on de-identification.

Personal information under the PDP Act

1.19

The definition of ‘personal affairs information’ under the Act is broader and captures more information than the definition of ‘personal information’ in the PDP Act.55 For example:

  • Personal affairs information under the Act includes ‘health information’,56 whereas ‘personal information’ under the PDP Act does not.
  • Personal affairs information under the Act includes the personal affairs information of deceased persons, whereas the PDP Act only protects the privacy of living persons.

Would disclosure be unreasonable?

1.20

Personal affairs information is not automatically exempt.64 A document is only exempt under section 33(1) if the disclosure of personal affairs information would be ‘unreasonable’ in the circumstances.65

1.21

To be satisfied that disclosure ‘would’ be unreasonable, an agency or Minister must have a high degree of confidence about that conclusion. ‘Would’ means that a result or effect will almost certainly occur.66 It is not enough to conclude that disclosure of a document might or could result in the unreasonable disclosure of personal affairs information.67 The need for a high degree of confidence reflects the object of the Act in section 3 to provide public access as far as possible.68

1.22

An agency or Minister must carefully weigh the facts and matters that ‘relevantly, logically, and probatively’ bear upon whether disclosure of the personal affairs information is unreasonable in the circumstances.69 This will vary with each case.

1.23

When deciding whether disclosure would be unreasonable, an agency or Minister must consider whether disclosure of the information would, or would be reasonably likely to, endanger the life or physical safety of any person.70 This mandatory consideration, and other common considerations, are explained below.

Consider the information in the document

1.24

When deciding whether disclosure would be unreasonable, consider:

  • The nature of the information in the document.77
    • The more sensitive the information, the more likely that disclosure would be unreasonable (for example, personal information of children is inherently sensitive).78
    • The more innocuous the information, the less likely that disclosure would be unreasonable.79
    • If the information has no current relevance or is aged, the less likely that disclosure would be unreasonable.
  • The circumstances in which the information was obtained.80
    • If the information was obtained in confidence, disclosure of that information is more likely to be unreasonable.81 However, confidentiality does not create a presumption in favour of unreasonableness.
  • The extent to which the information is available to the public.
    • If the information is largely in the public domain, disclosure is less likely to be unreasonable.82

Consider the applicant’s reasons for seeking the information

1.25

When deciding whether disclosure would be unreasonable, consider why the applicant seeks the information, including:

  • the applicant’s interest in the information;90
  • the applicant’s purpose for seeking access;91
  • the applicant’s motives for seeking access;92
  • whether the applicant is likely to disclose the information.93
1.26

An agency or Minister may also consider whether the applicant’s purpose for seeking access to the information is likely to be achieved by granting them access to that information.94 Where there would be no benefit to the applicant if the information were released, disclosure is more likely to be unreasonable.

1.27

If the applicant’s reason for seeking access is for the purpose of embarrassing or otherwise harming the persons concerned, disclosure is more likely to be unreasonable.95

1.28

Where there is a dispute or strained relations between the applicant and the third party, release of the third party’s personal affairs information is more likely to be unreasonable.96

Consider the public interest

1.29

When deciding whether disclosure would be unreasonable, consider:

  • Whether any public or important interest would be promoted by release of the information.100 There is a distinction between a matter which is in the public interest and a matter which is interesting to the public or merely a curiosity to the public.101
  • Whether disclosure of the information would be contrary to a public interest other than the public interest in protecting the privacy of the individuals referred to in the document. For example, disclosure is more likely to be unreasonable if the agency or Minister’s ability to obtain similar information in the future would be impaired by such disclosure.102
1.30

It may be unreasonable to release internal documents forming part of a police investigation in circumstances where the person being investigated was not charged or not yet charged.104

Consider the subject of the information

1.31

When deciding whether disclosure would be unreasonable, consider:

  • Whether the person to whom the information relates objects to the information being disclosed.113
  • The fact that the person does not want the information disclosed is a relevant consideration to be taken into account, but is not determinative.114 Conversely, the fact that a person does not object to disclosure does not necessarily mean section 33 does not apply.115 The capacity of a person who does not object to disclosure to understand the implications of release is a relevant factor.116
  • Whether the release of the information could lead to the person to whom it relates suffering stress and anxiety.117
  • Even though the applicant may know the persons involved, the decision-maker must consider the applicant’s likely reaction on seeing the personal information in the documents, and what the applicant might do with those documents.118 It may be found that disclosure is likely to cause stress and anxiety, even if that is not the applicant’s intention.119
  • Whether disclosure of the information would or would be reasonably likely to endanger the life or physical safety of any person.
  • Disclosure may still be unreasonable even if it would not be reasonably likely to endanger the life or physical safety of any person.120

See section 53A of the FOI Guidelines for information about:

  • VCAT reviews; and
  • seeking the views of the person whose personal affairs information appears in the document, as part of the VCAT review process.

Consider whether the personal affairs information is of agency officers and employees

1.32

Personal affairs information of agency officers or employees is not automatically exempt. Often, staff (regardless of their seniority) are identified while carrying out their role as a public sector employee. Their personal information is not usually sensitive, except for direct contact information such as a mobile phone number or email address in some instances.

1.33

Whether it is unreasonable to release information always depends on the circumstances of the request.124  An agency or Minister must consider if disclosure of an employee’s personal information to a particular applicant would be unreasonable in the circumstances.

1.34

An agency or Minister must take into account the factors above as well as:

  • The seniority of an employee.
  • The more senior their role, the greater their level of accountability for decisions, and the more likely their details are in the public domain. In those circumstances, disclosure is not unreasonable unless special circumstances apply.125
  • The relevance of the employee to the issue that is the subject of an applicant’s request.
  • If the employee was directly involved in the matter, then disclosure of their involvement is unlikely to be unreasonable. If an employee had an administrative role or was not directly involved in a decision making capacity, then disclosure may be unreasonable.
  • Whether the identity or personal information of the employee is known to the applicant or the public.
  • For example, despite their seniority, if the employee has a public facing role such as service delivery or attending public meetings, then the disclosure of their name is less likely to be unreasonable.
  • Other matters relevant to the employee.
  • This may include personal safety concerns either in relation to the applicant or another person,126 or the sensitivity of the employee’s role in the agency (for example, an undercover police officer).

Consider whether disclosure would endanger life or physical safety – mandatory consideration under section 33(2A)

1.35

When deciding if disclosure is unreasonable, an agency or Minister must consider if disclosure would endanger the life or physical safety of any person.134

1.36

Relevant factors that an agency or Minister must take into account include:

  • there must be a real chance of danger occurring, rather than a fanciful or remote chance;135
  • the danger to persons must arise from the disclosure of the specific document, rather than from other circumstances;136
  • the risk does not need to be from the applicant themselves; it may be from anyone, should the information become generally or publicly known;137
  • physical harm does not need be a certainty, the test is that the danger to physical safety is ‘reasonably likely’;138
  • physical safety is not only about actual safety; it is also about the relevant person’s perception as to whether they are safe;139 and
  • it is the impact on the relevant person or persons that is relevant, not the motives of the applicant.140

Handling requests for an applicant’s own personal affairs information

1.37

Generally, an applicant should be granted access to their own personal affairs information.145

1.38

However, there are exceptions to this general rule, including where:

  • there is a family violence matter;146
  • there is a child safety matter;147 and
  • the applicant requests access to their own health information.148

Family violence matters

1.39

If an applicant requests a document of an agency:

  • where that agency is an information sharing entity155 or an authorised Hub entity;156 and
  • the document contains information relating to the applicant’s personal affairs; and
  • the applicant is a person of concern, or a person who is alleged to pose a risk of committing family violence;

then in assessing whether disclosure would be unreasonable, the agency must also consider whether the disclosure of the document would increase the risk to a primary person’s safety from family violence.157

1.40

The Family Violence Protection Act 2008 (Vic) defines a primary person as an individual that an information sharing entity reasonably believes is at risk of being subjected to family violence.158 A primary person may include an affected family member, a child, or a protected person.159

1.41

If disclosure would be unreasonable, section 33(1) applies, even though the relevant information may relate only to the personal affairs of the applicant.

1.42

An agency may, in notifying the applicant of its decision in these circumstances, neither confirm nor deny the existence of a document.160

Child safety matters

1.43

If an applicant requests a document of an agency:

  • where that agency is an information sharing entity,165 authorised Hub entity,166 or restricted information sharing entity; and
  • the document contains information relating to the applicant’s personal affairs;

then in assessing whether disclosure would be unreasonable, the agency must also consider whether the disclosure of the document would increase the risk to the safety of a child or group of children.167

1.44

If disclosure would be unreasonable, section 33(1) applies, even though the relevant information may relate only to the personal affairs of the applicant.

1.45

An agency may, in notifying the applicant of its decision in these circumstances, neither confirm nor deny the existence of a document.168

Health information

1.46

‘Health information’ is defined in section 3 of the Health Records Act 2001 (Vic) (Health Records Act). Broadly, it relates to information or opinions about medical services provided to an individual.

Providing access outside the Act

1.47

An agency or Minister is encouraged, where possible, to make individuals’ own health information available to them without the requirement for an access request under the Act.

1.48

Mechanisms for informal release exist under both the Health Services Act 1988 (Vic) and Health Records Act.

1.49

Providing information through informal or administrative processes is generally more efficient for the agency or Minister and more cost-effective for applicants.

For more information, see OVIC’s Practice Note – Release of health records held by Victorian public sector agencies.

Providing access under the Act

1.50

Section 33(4) sets out additional processes when a request is made to an agency or Minister for an applicant’s own health information.

1.51

If the principal officer of an agency or the Minister believes on reasonable grounds that providing health information to the applicant would pose a serious threat to their life or health, the principal officer or the Minister must not give access to a document so far as it contains that information.171

1.52

If a principal officer or Minister does not give access, it is taken to be a refusal to provide access under section 26 of the Health Records Act and the document is considered an exempt document for the purposes of the FOI Act.

1.53

For agencies, the decision under section 33(4) must be made by a principal officer who is a registered health practitioner under the Health Practitioner Regulation National Law.172 Where the agency’s principal officer is not a registered health practitioner, the agency must appoint one to make this decision. There is no requirement for the Minister to be a medical practitioner.

1.54

The procedure set out in the Health Records Act provides an avenue for access to be provided through an appropriate health service provider nominated by the applicant and approved by the agency, where appropriate.

1.55

As a matter of practice, an agency or Minister may establish policies and procedures for assessing and determining whether reasonable grounds exist to indicate that the release of the document would pose a serious threat. In making this decision, an agency or Minister may consider:

  • if there is a history indicating the person has, or has previously had, serious mental health issues (for example, suicidal tendencies, severe anxiety or depression, or psychiatric treatment); or
  • whether there is a reasonable belief, based on credible and reliable evidence that the release of the health information would pose a serious threat to the applicant.
1.56

These considerations are not simple and may require an agency or Minister to obtain the view of a registered medical health practitioner. If the applicant consents, this could include the applicant’s regular treating doctor.

Third party consultation

1.57

When an agency or Minister decides that a document contains the personal affairs information of a third party (someone other than the applicant), the agency or Minister must consult with that person (subject to limited exceptions) about whether their personal affairs information should be disclosed to the applicant.

The requirement to consult and related considerations

1.58

In deciding whether to exempt a document under section 33(1), an agency or Minister must:

  • notify a third party who is the subject of the information (or if deceased, their next of kin) that a request has been received; and
  • seek that individual’s view as to whether they consent or object to disclosure of the document or information; and
  • advise the individual that if they consent to disclosure, they are not entitled to apply to VCAT to review a decision to grant access to the document.175
1.59

The third party’s view is not determinative. It is only one factor to be considered in deciding whether it is unreasonable to release the personal affairs information in the circumstances. 176

1.60

When consulting, the 30-day period for deciding a request may be extended by up to 15 days under section 21(2)(a).

1.61

Where appropriate, an agency or Minister should ask the applicant if they need third party information. If not, the scope of the request can be reduced to exclude third party information and avoid the need to consult with some or all third parties. This approach also assists the applicant by reducing processing times while giving access to the substance of a document.

1.62

If the applicant does want personal affairs information, the applicant could be encouraged to refine their request to limit the types or nature of the third party information they seek, and therefore limit the consultation required.

1.63

When consulting, Professional Standard 7.3 requires a record of the consultation to be kept. This includes who was consulted, whether they consented or objected, and any reasons provided.

Consultation with a child

1.64

A ‘child’ is defined in section 5 as a person under the age of 18 years.

1.65

Where the third party to be consulted is a child, an agency or Minister may notify either the child and / or their parent/guardian.182

1.66

There is an exception to notifying a parent or guardian. If an agency is an information sharing entity,183 the parent or guardian of the child must not be notified if the:

  • child is a primary person;184 and
  • parent or guardian is a person of concern185 or is alleged to pose a risk of family violence to that child.186
1.67

When considering who to notify, an agency or Minister should consider the exceptions to consultation in section 33(2C). The exceptions address situations where there are risks to life and safety, the risk of undue distress, or where consultation is unreasonable or not reasonably practicable in the circumstances.

Consultation with a next of kin

1.68

Where the third party is a deceased person, the person’s next of kin should be consulted.

1.69

The term ‘next of kin’ is not defined in the Act. An agency can adopt its own appropriate approach, based on the operating context or business, or the nature of the document.

1.70

The Human Tissue Act 1982 (Vic), Coroners Act 2008 (Vic), Guardian and Administration Act 2019 (Vic), and Administration and Probate Act 1958 (Vic) offer guidance as to who may be the appropriate next of kin in certain circumstances.

1.71

The next of kin may include a:

  • parent;
  • spouse or domestic partner;
  • brother or sister who is 18 years or older;
  • son or daughter who is 18 years or older; or
  • person who was a guardian immediately before a child’s death.

When consultation is not required

1.72

There are important circumstances when notification is not required, including:

  • where the notification would be reasonably likely to:
    • endanger the life or physical safety of that person;
    • cause that person undue distress;
    • is otherwise unreasonable in the circumstances; or
  • where the person to be notified is a ‘primary person’,189 and the notification would be reasonably likely to increase the risk to that person’s safety from family violence; or
  • where it is not reasonably practicable to do so.190

Undue distress

1.73

The fact an applicant has requested access to a public sector employee’s personal information and may make further requests to the agency in future, is not enough to establish that notifying the employee of the request and conducting consultation would be likely to cause the person ‘undue distress’.193

1.74

An applicant may make multiple requests for access. Responding to those requests is part of an agency’s duty under the Act. Annoyance or even distress at needing to respond to the requests does not meet the threshold of ‘undue’ distress.194

When is consultation not reasonably practicable?

1.75

The term ‘reasonably practicable’ is not defined in the Act.

1.76

The Macquarie Dictionary defines ‘practicable’ as ‘capable of being put into practice, done or effected, especially with the available means or with reason or prudence; feasible’. Something will be practicable if it is capable of being put into practice.199 The word ‘reasonably’ requires an assessment or judgement.200

1.77

An agency or Minister must exercise its reasonable and fair judgement to properly consider the reasonable practicability of consultation with each third party. The fact an agency or Minister is considering not releasing the document is not a reason, in and of itself, to not consult a third party.

1.78

The fact consultation is possible does not necessarily mean it is reasonably practicable.

1.79

In some circumstances, an agency or Minister may need to only consult with certain individuals with whom consultation is reasonably practicable.

1.80

Professional Standard 7.1 requires agencies to consider all relevant factors when determining if consultation is practicable and provides examples of factors that may be relevant when deciding whether to consult.

1.81

Factors outlined in Professional Standard 7.1 include:

  • The likelihood a third party will not consent to disclosure of information or a document.
    • If it is reasonable to expect a third party would be concerned about disclosure, or the agency or Minister is not sure whether a third party would consent to disclosure, this is a strong factor in favour of consulting.
    • If a third party would be reasonably unlikely to consent to the release of information under any circumstances, and the agency is sure that access will not be provided, an agency may decide that consultation is not practicable. For example, the third party is a victim of crime, and the applicant is the perpetrator.201
    • If an agency is confident that a third party would not object to release of the information, an agency may decide that consultation is not practicable. For example, where the information is not sensitive in nature, has already been disclosed, or the third party has previously informed the agency or Minister that they have no concerns with information of this nature being released.
  • The age of the information or document.
    • If the information or a document is historical or no longer current, an agency may decide that consultation is not practicable. Particularly where the contact details for a third party are no longer current or the agency could not easily find them in a timely way. Where any sensitivity about information or a document has diminished due to the passage of time, an agency may decide that consultation is not practicable given the reasonable likelihood that a third party would consent or not object to the disclosure of their name.
    • For example, building plans from 20 years ago contain a third party’s name, as the author of the plans. The building has since been demolished. There is no sensitivity about the information in the document and the third party’s name appears in the document in a professional capacity. It is reasonably likely the third party would not object to disclosure of their name.
  • The number of third parties to be notified.
    • Where the number of third parties to be notified is disproportionate to an agency’s size, resources and capacity to undertake consultation, it will be open to an agency to conclude consultation is not practicable.
    • For example, a document contains the names and contact details of 100 individuals. If the individuals need to be contacted separately, consultation is unlikely to be practicable. If the individuals are agency employees and could be easily contacted by email or other means (such as mail merge), consultation is more likely to be practicable.
  • Whether the agency has, or is reasonably able to find, current contact details.
    • If the address, phone number, or email of a third party are out of date and cannot be reasonably found, an agency may decide that consultation is not practicable.
    • For example, a request is made for a 7-year-old document containing the business affairs information of a third party and the personal affairs information of its employee. A search of online business registries reveals the company is now deregistered, and no contact details can be found for the former employee after a Google and White Pages search for the employee’s name. The agency determines consultation is not practicable with the business or the third party.
1.82

Where consultation is not practicable, an agency must record why.202 A record is not required to specify each third party and can be general in nature.

How to conduct consultation

1.83

Consultation may occur in any manner or form (for example, by telephone, email, post, or a meeting).

1.84

When undertaking consultation, an agency or Minister should tell a third party the applicable exemption and what must be established for the exemption to apply.204 This will help to enable a third party to provide an informed response and ensure their reasons are relevant, if they object to the document being released.

1.85

Providing a third party with a copy of the requested information or document can also assist them to make a more informed decision. Any information that is irrelevant to the third party or otherwise exempt should be deleted before the document is provided for consultation purposes.

1.86

An agency or Minister should tell a third party that their views on disclosure of the information are not determinative. The views of a third party are only one consideration alongside all other relevant considerations, including the object of the Act to make available the maximum amount of information possible subject to limited exceptions and exemptions required to protect essential public, private and business interests.

1.87

Where consultation is routine or common with a particular third party, it may be appropriate to consider ways to expedite the consultation process. For example, a policy which governs the consultation process and when third parties will be consulted. The policy should make clear that attention must still be given to the context of each request and that each request turns on its own circumstances.

Privacy considerations

1.88

The Act does not specify what information an agency or Minister should provide to a third party when undertaking consultation. It may be necessary for a third party to know the identity of the applicant, to decide whether to consent to release of a document, and how to frame any specific objections.

1.89

An agency should consider its obligations under the PDP Act when disclosing an applicant’s identity to a third party. IPP 2.1 in Schedule 1 of the PDP Act allows personal information, such as the name of an applicant, to be disclosed for the primary purpose for which it was collected only, unless an exception applies. Some exceptions include where:

  • the disclosure is for a related secondary purpose the applicant would reasonably expect their information to be used in this way – IPP 2.1(a); or
  • the applicant consents to the disclosure of their name – IPP 2.1(b).
1.90

Before disclosing the applicant’s name to a third party for consultation, an agency or Minister should ensure it is satisfied it has consent or authority to do so.

For more information about IPP 2, see the Guidelines to the Information Privacy Principles.

Keeping records of consultation under the Professional Standards

1.91

Where consultation is undertaken, under Professional Standard 7.3 an agency must record:

  • who was notified;
  • whether the third party did or did not respond to the consultation;
  • if the third party responded, whether they consented or objected to release; and
  • where provided, the third party’s reasons for objecting.
1.92

Where consultation is not practicable, an agency must record why.206 A record is not required to specify each third party and can be general in nature.

1.93

A record might include a file note, or an exchange of emails or letters.

1.94

Keeping a record of consultation helps to demonstrate that an agency has meaningfully and comprehensively consulted with the third party. It also makes it easier for an agency to provide information to OVIC on review.

Notifying a third party of the decision

1.95

If a third party (or if deceased, their next of kin) objected to the release of their personal affairs information, or did not respond to the consultation, and a decision is made to release that third party’s personal affairs information, the agency or Minister must, if reasonably practicable, notify the third party (or their next of kin) of:

  • the decision to grant access to the document; and
  • their right to apply to VCAT to review the decision.211
1.96

There is no requirement to notify a third party that consented to the release of their personal affairs information, as long as the decision reflects what the third party agreed to release.212

1.97

An agency or Minister should tell the applicant that the document will only be released at the end of the third party’s 60-day review period. This period begins on the day the third party is notified of the decision.

Learn more about notifying applicants of third party review rights in section 27.

1.98

If a third party was not consulted because it was not reasonably practicable, it is likely that it will also not be reasonably practicable for the agency or Minister to notify the third party of the decision to grant access to the document.213

1.99

If it is not reasonably practicable to notify a third party, the agency or Minister will still need to wait 60 days before releasing the document to the applicant.214

For more information, see section 50 – Applications for review by the Tribunal.

1.100

If a third party who objected to disclosing their information applies to VCAT to review a decision to release their information, an agency or Minister must not disclose the documents until the VCAT proceedings are finalised and directions are made.

For more information, see section 50 – Applications for review by the Tribunal.

Neither confirming nor denying the existence or non-existence of a document – section 33(6)

1.101

In some instances, disclosing information about the existence or non-existence of a document may itself be an unreasonable disclosure of an individual’s personal affairs information under section 33(1).

1.102

An agency or Minister may, in responding to an access request, neither confirm nor deny the existence or non-existence of a document.217 Before an agency or Minister does this, they must be satisfied including the details of their document search would involve the unreasonable disclosure of personal affairs information.218

1.101

Section 27(2) includes similar provisions when writing a decision:

  • Section 27(2)(a) enables an agency or Minister to not include information in a notice of decision that would cause the notice of decision to become an exempt document;
  • Sections 27(2)(ab) and (ac) allow an agency or Minister to neither confirm nor deny the existence of a document in a notice of decision, if to do so would increase the risk to:
    • a primary person’s safety from family violence; or
    • the safety of a child or group of children.

For more information, see section 27 – Reasons etc. to be given.

Adoption records

1.104

The purpose of section 33(7) is to ensure that requests for access to adoption records are processed according to the procedures in the Adoption Act 1984 (Vic).221

1.105

Adoption records means any documents which may be identified as having reference to or as standing in relation to the adoption in question.222

Assisted Reproductive Treatment Register

1.106

The purpose of section 33(8) is to ensure that requests for access to information kept in the assisted reproductive treatment register maintained under Division 1 of Part 6 of the Assisted Reproductive Treatment Act 2008 (Vic) (Assisted Reproductive Treatment Act) are processed according to the procedures in that Act.

1.107

Sections 49 and 49A of the Assisted Reproductive Treatment Act lists the types of information required to be kept in the register by registered assisted reproductive treatment providers and doctors. The procedures for access to information in the register are found in Division 3 of Part 6 of that Act.

  1. Victoria Police v Marke [2008] VSCA 218.
  2. Ryan v Department of Infrastructure [2004] VCAT 2346 [32].
  3. Hennessy v Minister Responsible for the Establishment of an Anti-Corruption Commission [2013] VCAT 822 [21] referring to Ryder v Booth (1989) VR 869, 877; Smith v Department of Sustainability and Environment [2006] VCAT 1228 [15].
  4. Victoria Police v Marke [2008] VSCA 218.
  5. Ryan v Department of Infrastructure [2004] VCAT 2346 [32].
  6. Hennessy v Minister Responsible for the Establishment of an Anti-Corruption Commission [2013] VCAT 822 [21] referring to Ryder v Booth (1989) VR 869, 877; Smith v Department of Sustainability and Environment [2006] VCAT 1228 [15].
  7. Targridge Pty Ltd v Road Traffic Authority (1988) 2 VAR 604; Melbourne University v Robinson [1993] 2 VR 177.
  8. Targridge Pty Ltd v Road Traffic Authority (1988) 2 VAR 604; Melbourne University v Robinson [1993] 2 VR 177.
  9. See examples, Crocker v Ambulance Victoria [2016] VCAT 2156; ‘EJ9’ and Northern Health [2021] VICmr 337.
  10. See examples, Crocker v Ambulance Victoria [2016] VCAT 2156; ‘EJ9’ and Northern Health [2021] VICmr 337.
  11. Freedom of Information Act 1982 (Vic), section 33(2).
  12. Freedom of Information Act 1982 (Vic), section 33(2).
  13. Victorian Public Service Board v Wright [1986] HCA 16 [3].
  14. Victorian Public Service Board v Wright [1986] HCA 16 [3].
  15. Defined in section 33(9).
  16. Defined in section 33(9).
  17. Freedom of Information Act 1982 (Vic), section 33(2AB).
  18. Freedom of Information Act 1982 (Vic), section 33(2AC).
  19. Freedom of Information Act 1982 (Vic), section 33(4).
  20. Defined in section 33(9).
  21. Defined in section 33(9).
  22. Freedom of Information Act 1982 (Vic), section 33(2AB).
  23. Freedom of Information Act 1982 (Vic), section 33(2AC).
  24. Freedom of Information Act 1982 (Vic), section 33(4).
  25. Hanson v Department of Education & Training [2007] VCAT 123.
  26. Re F and Health Department (1988) 2 VAR 458, quoted in RFJ v Victoria Police FOI Division [2013] VCAT 1267 [103], [109].
  27. Akers v Victoria Police [2003] VCAT 397 [104]; Conyers v Monash University [2005] VCAT 2509 [17].
  28. Hanson v Department of Education & Training [2007] VCAT 123.
  29. Re F and Health Department (1988) 2 VAR 458, quoted in RFJ v Victoria Police FOI Division [2013] VCAT 1267 [103], [109].
  30. Akers v Victoria Police [2003] VCAT 397 [104]; Conyers v Monash University [2005] VCAT 2509 [17].
  31. Akers v Victoria Police [2003] VCAT 397.
  32. See example Akers v Victoria Police [2022] VCAT 723 [124].
  33. See example ‘EP2’ and The Royal Children’s Hospital [2022] VICmr 165.
  34. See examples Mond v Department of Justice [2005] VCAT 2817; Monash University v Naik [2021] VCAT 557.
  35. See example Love v Department of Education [2023] VCAT 123.
  36. Horrocks v Department of Justice [2012] VCAT 241 [49], quoted in Evans v Victoria Police [2020] VCAT 426 [63].
  37. See examples ‘AB5’ and Victoria Police [2019] VICmr 14; Akers v Victoria Police [2003] VCAT 397.
  38. Mond v Building Commission of Victoria [2012] VCAT 796 [21]-[23].
  39. Akers v Victoria Police [2003] VCAT 397.
  40. See example Akers v Victoria Police [2022] VCAT 723 [124].
  41. See example ‘EP2’ and The Royal Children’s Hospital [2022] VICmr 165.
  42. See examples Mond v Department of Justice [2005] VCAT 2817; Monash University v Naik [2021] VCAT 557.
  43. See example Love v Department of Education [2023] VCAT 123.
  44. Horrocks v Department of Justice [2012] VCAT 241 [49], quoted in Evans v Victoria Police [2020] VCAT 426 [63].
  45. See examples ‘AB5’ and Victoria Police [2019] VICmr 14; Akers v Victoria Police [2003] VCAT 397.
  46. Mond v Building Commission of Victoria [2012] VCAT 796 [21]-[23].
  47. O’Sullivan v Department of Health & Community Services (No 2) (1995) 9 VAR 1, 14; Beauchamp v Department of Education [2006] VCAT 1653 [42]; NKY v Department of Education and Training [2022] VCAT 302 [67]-[68].
  48. Harrison v Victoria Police [2022] VCAT 280, [153].
  49. O’Sullivan v Department of Health & Community Services (No 2) (1995) 9 VAR 1, 14; Beauchamp v Department of Education [2006] VCAT 1653 [42]; NKY v Department of Education and Training [2022] VCAT 302 [67]-[68].
  50. Harrison v Victoria Police [2022] VCAT 280, [153].
  51. Williams v Victoria Police [2005] VCAT 2516, [42].
  52. Williams v Victoria Police [2005] VCAT 2516, [42].
  53. Privacy and Data Protection Act 2014 (Vic), section 3.
  54. As defined in section 3 of the Health Records Act 2001 (Vic).
  55. Privacy and Data Protection Act 2014 (Vic), section 3.
  56. As defined in section 3 of the Health Records Act 2001 (Vic).
  57. Note that section 6(2) of the Privacy and Data Protection Act 2014 (Vic) states that nothing in that Act affects the operation of the FOI Act or any right, privilege, obligation or liability conferred or imposed under that Act or any exemption arising under that Act.
  58. AB v Department of Human Services [2001] VCAT 2020 [38]; Victoria Police v Marke [2008] VSCA 218, [22].
  59. Victoria Police v Marke [2008] VSCA 218, [97].
  60. See examples where the agency did not produce sufficient evidence to establish that disclosure would be unreasonable: Akers v Victoria Police [2022] VCAT 723 [132]-[147]; Country Fire Authority v Rennie [2021] VCAT 492, [51]-[57].
  61. Victoria Police v Marke [2008] VSCA 218, [96]-[98].
  62. Victoria Police v Marke [2008] VSCA 218, [98].
  63. Freedom of Information Act 1982 (Vic), section 33(2A).
  64. Note that section 6(2) of the Privacy and Data Protection Act 2014 (Vic) states that nothing in that Act affects the operation of the FOI Act or any right, privilege, obligation or liability conferred or imposed under that Act or any exemption arising under that Act.
  65. AB v Department of Human Services [2001] VCAT 2020 [38]; Victoria Police v Marke [2008] VSCA 218, [22].
  66. Victoria Police v Marke [2008] VSCA 218, [97].
  67. See examples where the agency did not produce sufficient evidence to establish that disclosure would be unreasonable: Akers v Victoria Police [2022] VCAT 723 [132]-[147]; Country Fire Authority v Rennie [2021] VCAT 492, [51]-[57].
  68. Victoria Police v Marke [2008] VSCA 218, [96]-[98].
  69. Victoria Police v Marke [2008] VSCA 218, [98].
  70. Freedom of Information Act 1982 (Vic), section 33(2A).
  71. Page v Metropolitan Transit Authority (1988) 2 VAR 243, 246.
  72. NKY v Department of Education and Training [2022] VCAT 302 [70]; Love v Department of Education [2023] VCAT 123, [30].
  73. See example Crocker v Ambulance Victoria [2016] VCAT 2156.
  74. Page v Metropolitan Transit Authority (1988) 2 VAR 243 at 246.
  75. Levy v Department of Sustainability & Environment [2011] VCAT 417 [18]; AB v Department of Education & Early Childhood Development [2011] VCAT 1263 [57]; Akers v The Royal Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals (Review and Regulation) [2023] VCAT 602 [222].
  76. See example Harrison v Victoria Police [2022] VCAT 280 [153]-[154].
  77. Page v Metropolitan Transit Authority (1988) 2 VAR 243, 246.
  78. NKY v Department of Education and Training [2022] VCAT 302 [70]; Love v Department of Education [2023] VCAT 123, [30].
  79. See example Crocker v Ambulance Victoria [2016] VCAT 2156.
  80. Page v Metropolitan Transit Authority (1988) 2 VAR 243 at 246.
  81. Levy v Department of Sustainability & Environment [2011] VCAT 417 [18]; AB v Department of Education & Early Childhood Development [2011] VCAT 1263 [57]; Akers v The Royal Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals (Review and Regulation) [2023] VCAT 602 [222].
  82. See example Harrison v Victoria Police [2022] VCAT 280 [153]-[154].
  83. Penhalluriack v Department of Labour and Industry (unreported, County Court, Vic, Lazarus J, 19 December 1983); Knight v Public Correctional Enterprise [2002] VCAT 1769 [13]; McNamara v Department of Human Services [2004] VCAT 1085 [10]; Vaughan v Department of Sustainability and Environment [2004] VCAT 1562 [25].
  84. Targridge Pty Ltd v Road Traffic Authority (1988) 2 VAR 604; Vaughan v Department of Sustainability and Environment [2004] VCAT 1562 [25]; McNamara v Department of Human Services [2004] VCAT 1085 [10]; Zacek v Medical Practitioners Board (Vic) [2005] VCAT 114 [61]; Levy v Department of Sustainability & Environment [2011] VCAT 417 [17].
  85. Pinder v Medical Practitioners Board (1996) 10 VAR 75 at 90; Knight v Public Correctional Enterprise [2002] VCAT 1769 [19]; Akers v Victoria Police [2003] VCAT 398 [57]; Vaughan v Department of Sustainability and Environment [2004] VCAT 1562 [58]; Conyers v Monash University [2005] VCAT 2509 [18]; Williams v Victoria Police [2005] VCAT 2516 [32].
  86. Victoria Police v Marke [2008] VSCA 218.
  87. Hanson v Department of Education & Training [2007] VCAT 123, [16]; Pritchard v Victoria Police [2008] VCAT 913, [31]; Pezzimenti v Victorian WorkCover Authority [2008] VCAT 449, [24].
  88. Greater Shepparton City Council v Hamilton [2021] VCAT 1316 [18]-[22], [36].
  89. ‘FA6’ and Department of Energy, Environment and Climate Action [2023] VICmr 14, [21].
  90. Penhalluriack v Department of Labour and Industry (unreported, County Court, Vic, Lazarus J, 19 December 1983); Knight v Public Correctional Enterprise [2002] VCAT 1769 [13]; McNamara v Department of Human Services [2004] VCAT 1085 [10]; Vaughan v Department of Sustainability and Environment [2004] VCAT 1562 [25].
  91. Targridge Pty Ltd v Road Traffic Authority (1988) 2 VAR 604; Vaughan v Department of Sustainability and Environment [2004] VCAT 1562 [25]; McNamara v Department of Human Services [2004] VCAT 1085 [10]; Zacek v Medical Practitioners Board (Vic) [2005] VCAT 114 [61]; Levy v Department of Sustainability & Environment [2011] VCAT 417 [17].
  92. Pinder v Medical Practitioners Board (1996) 10 VAR 75 at 90; Knight v Public Correctional Enterprise [2002] VCAT 1769 [19]; Akers v Victoria Police [2003] VCAT 398 [57]; Vaughan v Department of Sustainability and Environment [2004] VCAT 1562 [58]; Conyers v Monash University [2005] VCAT 2509 [18]; Williams v Victoria Police [2005] VCAT 2516 [32].
  93. Victoria Police v Marke [2008] VSCA 218.
  94. Hanson v Department of Education & Training [2007] VCAT 123, [16]; Pritchard v Victoria Police [2008] VCAT 913, [31]; Pezzimenti v Victorian WorkCover Authority [2008] VCAT 449, [24].
  95. Greater Shepparton City Council v Hamilton [2021] VCAT 1316 [18]-[22], [36].
  96. ‘FA6’ and Department of Energy, Environment and Climate Action [2023] VICmr 14, [21].
  97. Vaughan v Department of Sustainability and Environment [2004] VCAT 1562 [65], [66]; Morgan v Port Phillip City Council [2008] VCAT 978 [45].
  98. Director of Public Prosecutions v Smith [1991] 1 VR 63 [75]; Gibson v Latrobe City Council [2008] VCAT 1340 [74]; Davies v Victoria Police [2022] VCAT 713, [62].
  99. Richards v Transport Accident Commission [2005] VCAT 1444; see example ‘FB5’ v Department of Education [2023] VICmr 22 [31], [34].
  100. Vaughan v Department of Sustainability and Environment [2004] VCAT 1562 [65], [66]; Morgan v Port Phillip City Council [2008] VCAT 978 [45].
  101. Director of Public Prosecutions v Smith [1991] 1 VR 63 [75]; Gibson v Latrobe City Council [2008] VCAT 1340 [74]; Davies v Victoria Police [2022] VCAT 713, [62].
  102. Richards v Transport Accident Commission [2005] VCAT 1444; see example ‘FB5’ v Department of Education [2023] VICmr 22 [31], [34].
  103. Kyriazis v Victoria Police [2011] VCAT 365; JCL v Victoria Police [2012] VCAT 1060.
  104. Kyriazis v Victoria Police [2011] VCAT 365; JCL v Victoria Police [2012] VCAT 1060.
  105. Page v Metropolitan Transit Authority (1988) 2 VAR 243, 245–246.
  106. Marke v Victoria Police [2007] VSC 522, [45].
  107. McNamara v Deakin University [2011] VCAT 1089, [49].
  108. McNamara v Department of Human Services [2010] VCAT 1237, [41].
  109. Reilly v Kilmore & District Hospital (1993) 6 VAR 16; Koch v Swinburne University [2004] VCAT 1513 [34]; Vaughan v Department of Sustainability and Environment [2004] VCAT 1562; Hanson v Department of Education & Training [2007] VCAT 123, [16].
  110. AB v Department of Education & Early Childhood Development [2011] VCAT 1263, [58].
  111. Edwards v Museum Victoria [2011] VCAT 1421, [40(b)].
  112. Teong v Monash University (2003) 20 VAR 153 [21]. In Brygel v Victoria Police [2014] VCAT 1199, [56], VCAT found it unnecessary to consider section 33(2A) where it had already found that section 33(1) was satisfied.
  113. Page v Metropolitan Transit Authority (1988) 2 VAR 243, 245–246.
  114. Marke v Victoria Police [2007] VSC 522, [45].
  115. McNamara v Deakin University [2011] VCAT 1089, [49].
  116. McNamara v Department of Human Services [2010] VCAT 1237, [41].
  117. Reilly v Kilmore & District Hospital (1993) 6 VAR 16; Koch v Swinburne University [2004] VCAT 1513 [34]; Vaughan v Department of Sustainability and Environment [2004] VCAT 1562; Hanson v Department of Education & Training [2007] VCAT 123, [16].
  118. AB v Department of Education & Early Childhood Development [2011] VCAT 1263, [58].
  119. Edwards v Museum Victoria [2011] VCAT 1421, [40(b)].
  120. Teong v Monash University (2003) 20 VAR 153 [21]. In Brygel v Victoria Police [2014] VCAT 1199, [56], VCAT found it unnecessary to consider section 33(2A) where it had already found that section 33(1) was satisfied.
  121. Harrison v Victoria Police [2022] VCAT 280 [149].
  122. Marke v Victoria Police [2020] VCAT 557; ‘FB4’ and Moonee Valley City Council [2023] VICmr 21 [53].
  123. Monash University v Naik [2021] VCAT 557 [45], [47], [48]; Chopra v Department of Education [2019] VCAT 1941.
  124. Harrison v Victoria Police [2022] VCAT 280 [149].
  125. Marke v Victoria Police [2020] VCAT 557; ‘FB4’ and Moonee Valley City Council [2023] VICmr 21 [53].
  126. Monash University v Naik [2021] VCAT 557 [45], [47], [48]; Chopra v Department of Education [2019] VCAT 1941.
  127. Freedom of Information Act 1982 (Vic), section 33(2A).
  128. Vaughan v Department of Sustainability and Environment [2004] VCAT 1562 [51]; Department of Agriculture and Rural Affairs v Binnie [1989] VR 836, 842.
  129. Re Lawless and Secretary to Law Department (1985) 1 VAR 42, 50–51.
  130. Department of Agriculture and Rural Affairs v Binnie [1989] VR 836, 844.
  131. Department of Agriculture and Rural Affairs v Binnie [1989] VR 836, 844.
  132. O’Sullivan v Victoria Police [2005] VCAT 532 [19]; Huang v Frankston City Council [2021] VCAT 634, [54]-[55].
  133. O’Sullivan v Victoria Police [2005] VCAT 532, [19].
  134. Freedom of Information Act 1982 (Vic), section 33(2A).
  135. Vaughan v Department of Sustainability and Environment [2004] VCAT 1562 [51]; Department of Agriculture and Rural Affairs v Binnie [1989] VR 836, 842.
  136. Re Lawless and Secretary to Law Department (1985) 1 VAR 42, 50–51.
  137. Department of Agriculture and Rural Affairs v Binnie [1989] VR 836, 844.
  138. Department of Agriculture and Rural Affairs v Binnie [1989] VR 836, 844.
  139. O’Sullivan v Victoria Police [2005] VCAT 532 [19]; Huang v Frankston City Council [2021] VCAT 634, [54]-[55].
  140. O’Sullivan v Victoria Police [2005] VCAT 532, [19].
  141. Freedom of Information Act 1982 (Vic), section 33(2).
  142. Freedom of Information Act 1982 (Vic), section 33(2AB).
  143. Freedom of Information Act 1982 (Vic), section 33(2AC).
  144. Freedom of Information Act 1982 (Vic), section 33(4).
  145. Freedom of Information Act 1982 (Vic), section 33(2).
  146. Freedom of Information Act 1982 (Vic), section 33(2AB).
  147. Freedom of Information Act 1982 (Vic), section 33(2AC).
  148. Freedom of Information Act 1982 (Vic), section 33(4).
  149. Prescribed in Schedule 1 of the Family Violence (Information Sharing and Risk Management) Regulations 2018 (Vic).
  150. Defined in section 144SB of the Family Violence Protection Act 2008 (Vic).
  151. Freedom of Information Act 1982 (Vic), section 33(2AB).
  152. Family Violence Protection Act 2008 (Vic), section 144E.
  153. ‘Protected person’ is defined in section 4 of the Family Violence Protection Act 2008 (Vic).
  154. Freedom of Information Act 1982 (Vic), sections 33(6) and 27(2)(b).
  155. Prescribed in Schedule 1 of the Family Violence (Information Sharing and Risk Management) Regulations 2018 (Vic).
  156. Defined in section 144SB of the Family Violence Protection Act 2008 (Vic).
  157. Freedom of Information Act 1982 (Vic), section 33(2AB).
  158. Family Violence Protection Act 2008 (Vic), section 144E.
  159. ‘Protected person’ is defined in section 4 of the Family Violence Protection Act 2008 (Vic).
  160. Freedom of Information Act 1982 (Vic), sections 33(6) and 27(2)(b).
  161. Prescribed in Schedule 1 of the Family Violence (Information Sharing and Risk Management) Regulations 2018 (Vic).
  162. Defined in section 144SB of the Family Violence Protection Act 2008 (Vic).
  163. Freedom of Information Act 1982 (Vic), section 33(2AC).
  164. Freedom of Information Act 1982 (Vic), sections 33(6) and 27(2)(b).
  165. Prescribed in Schedule 1 of the Family Violence (Information Sharing and Risk Management) Regulations 2018 (Vic).
  166. Defined in section 144SB of the Family Violence Protection Act 2008 (Vic).
  167. Freedom of Information Act 1982 (Vic), section 33(2AC).
  168. Freedom of Information Act 1982 (Vic), sections 33(6) and 27(2)(b).
  169. Freedom of Information Act 1982 (Vic), sections 33(4).
  170. Freedom of Information Act 1982 (Vic), sections 33(5).
  171. Freedom of Information Act 1982 (Vic), sections 33(4).
  172. Freedom of Information Act 1982 (Vic), sections 33(5).
  173. Freedom of Information Act 1982 (Vic), section 33(2B).
  174. Marke v Victoria Police [2007] VSC 522 [45].
  175. Freedom of Information Act 1982 (Vic), section 33(2B).
  176. Marke v Victoria Police [2007] VSC 522 [45].
  177. Freedom of Information Act 1982 (Vic), sections 33A(1). Section 33A outlines an agency’s or Minister’s obligations when consulting with a child.
  178. Defined in section 144D of the Family Violence Protection Act 2008 (Vic).
  179. Defined in section 144E of the Family Violence Protection Act 2008 (Vic).
  180. Defined in section 144B of the Family Violence Protection Act 2008 (Vic).
  181. Freedom of Information Act 1982 (Vic), section 33A(2).
  182. Freedom of Information Act 1982 (Vic), sections 33A(1). Section 33A outlines an agency’s or Minister’s obligations when consulting with a child.
  183. Defined in section 144D of the Family Violence Protection Act 2008 (Vic).
  184. Defined in section 144E of the Family Violence Protection Act 2008 (Vic).
  185. Defined in section 144B of the Family Violence Protection Act 2008 (Vic).
  186. Freedom of Information Act 1982 (Vic), section 33A(2).
  187. Section 33(9) provides that a ‘primary person’ has the meaning given in section 144E of the Family Violence Protection Act 2008 (Vic).
  188. Freedom of Information Act 1982 (Vic), section 33(2C).
  189. Section 33(9) provides that a ‘primary person’ has the meaning given in section 144E of the Family Violence Protection Act 2008 (Vic).
  190. Freedom of Information Act 1982 (Vic), section 33(2C).
  191. Akers v Victoria Police [2022] VCAT 723, [35]-[43].
  192. Akers v Victoria Police [2022] VCAT 723, [35]-[43].
  193. Akers v Victoria Police [2022] VCAT 723, [35]-[43].
  194. Akers v Victoria Police [2022] VCAT 723, [35]-[43].
  195. Uebergang v Australian Wheat Board (1980) 145 CLR, 9.
  196. Al Kateb v Godwin [2004] HCA 37, [121].
  197. Crocker v Ambulance Victoria [2016] VCAT 2156.
  198. Professional Standard 7.2.
  199. Uebergang v Australian Wheat Board (1980) 145 CLR, 9.
  200. Al Kateb v Godwin [2004] HCA 37, [121].
  201. Crocker v Ambulance Victoria [2016] VCAT 2156.
  202. Professional Standard 7.2.
  203. See note to Professional Standard 7.3.
  204. See note to Professional Standard 7.3.
  205. Professional Standard 7.2.
  206. Professional Standard 7.2.
  207. Freedom of Information Act 1982 (Vic), section 33(3).
  208. Freedom of Information Act 1982 (Vic), section 33(3A).
  209. Freedom of Information Act 1982 (Vic), section 35(1C).
  210. A third party has review rights, irrespective of whether they are notified of the decision. See Freedom of Information Act 1982 (Vic), section 50(3).
  211. Freedom of Information Act 1982 (Vic), section 33(3).
  212. Freedom of Information Act 1982 (Vic), section 33(3A).
  213. Freedom of Information Act 1982 (Vic), section 35(1C).
  214. A third party has review rights, irrespective of whether they are notified of the decision. See Freedom of Information Act 1982 (Vic), section 50(3).
  215. Freedom of Information Act 1982 (Vic), section 33(6).
  216. AOZ v JLV [2019] VCAT 31 [204].
  217. Freedom of Information Act 1982 (Vic), section 33(6).
  218. AOZ v JLV [2019] VCAT 31 [204].
  219. See Part 6 of the Adoption Act 1984 (Vic).
  220. Thomas v Royal Women’s Hospital (1988) 2 VAR 618, 626.
  221. See Part 6 of the Adoption Act 1984 (Vic).
  222. Thomas v Royal Women’s Hospital (1988) 2 VAR 618, 626.

Download

FOI-Guidelines-Draft-Part-IV-Exempt-documents-2.docx

FOI-Guidelines-Draft-Part-IV-Exempt-documents-2.docx
Size 1.72 MB

Download
FOI-Guidelines-Draft-Part-IV-Exempt-documents-2.pdf

FOI-Guidelines-Draft-Part-IV-Exempt-documents-2.pdf
Size 3.56 MB

Download

Contents

Back to Index

Details

Last updated 13 November 2024

Back to top
Back to Top